

Updated February 2017

OSCE Transnational Threats Department
 Tel: +431514366788 • Fax: +431514366687
 6 Wallnerstrasse, 1010 Vienna • atu@osce.org • www.osce.org/atu

CONSOLIDATED REFERENCE FOR OSCE ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS

CONTENTS

LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK	3
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (CT-RELEVANT)	3
Sanctions against Al Qaida, the Taliban and ISIL.....	3
UNSCR 1373 (2001).....	5
UNSCR 1540 (2004).....	5
UNSCR 1566 (2004).....	6
UNSCR 1624 (2005).....	6
UNSCR 2133 (2014).....	6
UNSCR 2170 (2014).....	6
UNSCR 2178 (2014).....	7
UNSCR 2195 (2014).....	7
UNSCR 2220 (2015).....	7
UNSCR 2242 (2015) and 2250 (2015).....	8
THE UNIVERSAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM	8
a) Related to aviation security	9
b) Related to maritime security	10
c) Related to nuclear security	11
d) Related to protected persons and hostages	11
e) Related to explosives and bombings.....	12
f) Related to terrorism financing	13
KEY OSCE CT COMMITMENTS.....	14
2001 Bucharest Ministerial Council	15
2002 Porto Ministerial Council	15
2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council	15
2004 Sofia Ministerial Council	15
2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Council	15
2006 Brussels Ministerial Council	15
2007 Madrid Ministerial Council.....	16
2008 Helsinki Ministerial Council	16
2009 Athens Ministerial Council	16
2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council.....	16
2012 Dublin Ministerial Council	16
2013 Kyiv Ministerial Council.....	16
2014 Basel Ministerial Council.....	17
2015 Belgrade Ministerial Council	17
2016 Hamburg Ministerial Council	18
OSCE'S COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITMENTS AT WORK	19
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS DEPARTMENT (TNTD).....	19
Co-ordination Cell (TNTD/CC).....	20
Action against Terrorism Unit (TNTD/ATU)	20
Strategic Police Matters Unit (TNTD/SPMU)	25
Border Security and Management Unit (TNTD/BSMU)	26
CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE / FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION SUPPORT SECTION	28
OFFICE OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF OSCE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES (OCEEA)	32
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND CO-ORDINATOR FOR COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS	33
EXTERNAL CO-OPERATION (EXTCo)	34
OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ODIHR).....	35
REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA (RFoM)	38
ANNEX 1 (DECISIONS AND DOCUMENTS).....	40
ANNEX 2 (CONTACT POINTS)	43

FOREWORD

This Consolidated Reference aims to inform all personnel of the Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as Offices, Institutions, Field Operations, and other interested relevant organizations of international and OSCE commitments, projects and programmes related to the prevention and combating of terrorism.

The Consolidated Reference also can be used as an aid in conceptualizing, planning and implementing activities within the general scope of the OSCE anti-terrorism goals.

The Action against Terrorism Unit of the Transnational Threats Department (TNTD/ATU) compiles this Reference as an effort to further strengthen its co-operation with the OSCE family in order to streamline anti-terrorism in relevant activities. As the threat of international terrorism is not static but ever-changing, this document is updated on a yearly basis.

The Consolidated Reference is intended to be succinct and practical. It includes examples of relevant activities from Units within the TNT Department and from other OSCE executive structures that can also help partners in designing activities for countering terrorism.

We would like to express our readiness to support the OSCE executive structures, participating States and Partners for Co-operation in the design, planning and implementation of their counter-terrorism activities.

We would appreciate your written comments and suggestions at atu@osce.org



Rasa Ostrauskaite
Co-ordinator to
address Transnational
Threats



Thomas Wuchte
Head of TNTD/ATU

LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The legal and political framework for OSCE activities related to terrorism is formed by several UN and OSCE documents that are detailed here. They also provide program activities with a foundation for the OSCE to co-operate with the UN family and other international and regional organizations in fighting terrorism.

The UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), as well as the Universal Anti-Terrorism Instruments (UATI), guided by the UN Global Counter-terrorism Strategy, constitute a solid and comprehensive legal basis for combating terrorism on a universal scale and provide a clear road map for the steps that need to be taken.

[The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy](#) provides important guidance for the OSCE counter-terrorism (CT) activities. It outlines a comprehensive global approach towards countering terrorism and is of great importance to the OSCE's counter-terrorism efforts. The Strategy was adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006 and is reviewed every second year. It is the first ever comprehensive, collective and internationally approved global framework tackling the problem of terrorism.

The Strategy sets out a plan of action for the international community based on four pillars: measures to address the conditions conducive to terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.

The primary responsibility for implementing the Strategy lies with UN Member States. However, the UN departments, programmes, funds and agencies have been taking actions in a number of areas in line with the four pillars of the Strategy both in their individual capacity and through their joint efforts in the framework of the [Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force](#) (CTITF). The CTITF was established by the UN Secretary-General in July 2005 to ensure overall co-ordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations

system. The Task Force consists of over 30 UN system entities and aims to catalyze the implementation of the Strategy through a number of thematic initiatives and working groups. Additionally, in resolution A/RES/66/10 (2011), the General Assembly endorsed the creation of the UNCTC (UN Counter Terrorism Centre) within the CTITF Office, and encouraged Member States to collaborate with the [Centre](#).

The [UN Plan of Action to Prevent Extremism](#) was issued on 24 December 2015 as a Report of the UN Secretary General. The Plan focuses on preventive measures for addressing violent extremism, including by reinvigorating those measures covered under pillars I and IV of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, ensuring a more comprehensive implementation of the Strategy in view of the lessons learned over the past decade and the challenges that may lie ahead. Following an introduction, the Plan discusses in separate chapters the impact of violent extremism; the context and drivers of violent extremism; an agenda for action: recommendations on preventing violent extremism; and an appeal for concerted action.

The Security Council has been consistently dealing with terrorism through resolutions and by establishing several subsidiary bodies. A [comparative table](#) provides clarification regarding their distinct but complementary role.

All UNSCR relevant to fight terrorism can be found [here](#). Among them the most significant are the following:

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (CT-RELEVANT)

Sanctions against Al Qaida, the Taliban and ISIL

[Resolution 1267 \(1999\)](#) established a sanctions regime that has evolved as a practical response to the global threat to international peace and security posed by Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates. This resolution also created an [Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee](#) ('the 1267 Committee'). To ensure that the sanctions regime remains a relevant and effective tool in countering terrorism, it has been modified and strengthened by subsequent

resolutions². [Resolution 1904 \(2009\)](#) improved the procedures of the 1267 Committee in terms of due process, fairness and transparency, thus strengthening the sanctions regime's effectiveness and legitimacy.

Following UNSCR 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011), the Security Council decided to split the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime.

The above resolutions have been adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and require all States to: freeze the assets of, prevent the entry into or transit through their territories, and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment to any individual or entity associated with Al-Qaida, and/or the Taliban as designated by the 1267 Committee. The primary responsibility for the implementation of the sanctions measures rests with Member States and effective implementation is mandatory.

In addition to overseeing States' implementation of the sanctions measures, the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) maintains [The Al-Qaida Sanctions List](#) of individuals and entities. Member States can submit new names of individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida, or the Taliban to the Committee for inclusion on the List. The Committee also considers requests for delisting³, provides recommendations to the Council and handles requests for exemptions under [Resolution 1452](#) (2002). The Committee is currently reviewing entries on the List to ensure that it remains dynamic and accurately reflects the current threat from Al-Qaida and the Taliban. You can find here narrative summaries of [reasons for listing](#) of the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the List (where available). The Committee is assisted in its work by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, a group of experts that examines sanctions implementation and offers suggestions on how to make further improvements. The Committee documents and

the Team's reports can be found on the [1267 Committee's website](#).

With a view to suppressing the financing of terrorism, the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter adopted [Resolution 2253 \(2015\) to expand](#) the UN sanctions framework to ISIL/Dae'sh. The Council decided that the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee would be known as the **"1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee"**, while the Al-Qaida Sanctions List would be known as the **"ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List"**. The Council, through the text, reaffirmed that those responsible for committing, organizing or supporting terrorist acts must be held accountable, and urged States to provide full coordination in investigations or proceedings involving ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. In that context, it reiterated States' obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territory not make available economic resources to those actors — which applied to both direct and indirect trade in oil, modular refineries and related chemicals and lubricants, among other natural resources. The Council also decided that States would take appropriate measures to promote enhanced vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated on their territory, to prevent ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals and groups from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives or raw materials that could be used in their manufacture.

All communications regarding updates to the Consolidated List are circulated to the focal points of the [OSCE Counter-Terrorism Network \(CTN\)](#).

More details can be found here: [work and mandate of the ISIL \(Da'esh\) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee](#). This has been prepared for the use of international, regional and sub-regional organizations and agencies, for distribution to their membership and during training programmes to explain the work and mandate of the Committee.

Find here a [Compilation of Good Practices, Codes and Standards](#) that facilitate implementation of UNSCR 1624.

² Resolutions 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988, 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2161, 2170 and 2178 (2014). They are available at: www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/resolutions.shtml

³ In Resolution 1904 (2009), the Council authorized the establishment of an independent ombudsperson to assist the Committee in its consideration of delisting requests.

UNSCR 1373 (2001)

As a response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Security Council adopted [Resolution 1373](#) on 28 September 2001, which declared that “acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. It called upon Member States to “become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols” and “increase co-operation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols”.

UNSCR 1373 is the basic document adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which imposes certain legal obligations and calls upon all UN Member States to become party to and implement the applicable UN anti-terrorism conventions and protocols related to the fight against terrorism. It also established the [Counter-Terrorism Committee](#) of the Security Council (CTC), which is mandated to bring Member States to an acceptable level of compliance with Resolution 1373 and the terrorism-related conventions and protocols. The Security Council established the [Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate](#) (CTED) pursuant to Resolution 1535 (2004), in order to enhance the ability of the CTC to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001) and effectively continue its capacity-building work⁴.

Among the actions required to be taken by resolution 1373, States shall:

- (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
- (b) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
- (c) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in

domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;

- (d) Provide one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or supporting of terrorist acts, including providing assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings.

In elaborating means to accomplish these mandatory obligations, Resolution 1373 called upon all States to:

- (a) Become parties, as soon as possible, to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
- (b) Increase co-operation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and UNSCR 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001).

Find here a [Directory of International Best Practices, Codes and Standards](#) that facilitate implementation of UNSCR 1373; and a [Global Survey with the Implementation of UNSCR 1373](#).

UNSCR 1540 (2004)

The objective of [UNSCR 1540](#) is to prevent individuals and organizations, including terrorist groups, from developing or obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations on 28 April 2004. It obliges UN Member States to take a range of steps aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their delivery systems and related materials, especially by non-State actors. It encourages enhanced international co-operation on such efforts. The resolution affirms support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of WMDs and the importance for all States to implement them fully. By Resolution 1977 (2011), the mandate of the 1540 Committee was extended till the year 2021. In addition, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2325 (2016)

⁴ [UNSCR 2129](#) (2013) extended the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) until December 2017, and strengthened UN CTED's role.

building on Resolution 1540, with the aim to facilitate its full and effective implementation. The Resolution was co-sponsored by 78 States. Relevant information is available on the [1540 Committee's website](#).

UNSCR 1566 (2004)

[UNSCR 1566](#) calls upon States to co-operate fully in the fight against terrorism and outlines the main elements of a *de facto* definition of a terrorist act in operational paragraph 3, which says “Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature”.

This resolution sets up a working group to consider recommendations on further measures that can be used against individuals and entities involved in terrorism and that have not been identified by the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. This includes examining appropriate approaches for bringing them to justice through prosecution or extradition. The Resolution tasks the working group with considering the possibility of an international fund to compensate victims of terrorism and their families.

UNSCR 1624 (2005)

[UNSCR 1624](#) condemns the incitement of terrorist acts and repudiates attempts to justify or glorify terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist attacks. The resolution calls on States to take appropriate steps to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act, to prevent such conduct and to deny safe haven to any

person who has been guilty of such conduct. For more information see also the [CTED Global Survey on the implementation of the UNSCR 1624](#).

UNSCR 2133 (2014)

[UNSCR 2133](#) strongly condemns incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups for any purpose, including raising funds or gaining political concessions. The document calls on Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages. The document encourages Member States to strengthen their efforts to support victims and people affected by incidents of kidnapping for ransom and hostage – taking committed by terrorists. The Resolution calls upon Member States to co-operate closely during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to involve private sector partners, as well as to adopt or to follow relevant guidelines and good practices for preventing and responding to terrorist kidnappings without paying ransoms.

UNSCR 2170 (2014)

[UNSCR 2170](#) concerns territory in parts of Iraq and Syria that is under the control of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al Nusrah Front (ANF) focusing on the negative impact of their presence and their violent extremist ideology as well as their actions on the stability of Iraq, Syria and the region. The resolution calls on all UN Member States to act to suppress the flow of foreign fighters, financing and other support to Islamist extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. It called on Member States to take national measures to prevent fighters from travelling from their soil to join these groups, reiterating obligations under previous counter-terrorism resolutions to prevent the movement of terrorists, as well as their supply with arms or financial support. It expressed readiness to consider putting on the sanctions list those who facilitate the recruitment and travel of foreign fighters.

UNSCR 2178 (2014)

[UNSCR 2178](#) expresses concern on the increasing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (hereinafter FTF). The resolution defines the notion of FTF as: “individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”. The UNSCR obliges the Member States to “Prevent and suppress recruiting, organizing, transporting, and equipping of FTF, and the financing of FTF and ensure establishment of serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide ability to prosecute and to penalize. Moreover, the Resolution calls Member States to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of any individuals believed to be travelling for the purposes of planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts. The UNSCR 2178 encourages Member States to engage in international and (sub-) regional co-operation to prevent FTF travel, to co-operate in terrorism-related investigations and prosecution and to assist each other in building the capacity to address the FTF threat. A full list of UN documents related to FTF can be found at the [UN CTC site](#).

UNSCR 2195 (2014)

[UNSCR 2195](#) condemns terrorism in all its forms regardless of the motivations behind terrorist acts, and reaffirms that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization. The resolution expresses a grave concern about the financial resources and other assets obtained by terrorists, underscoring that these resources will support their future terrorist activities. The main concern is that terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of arms, persons, drugs and artefacts, and from the illicit trade in natural resources, as well as from kidnapping for ransom and other crimes like extortion and bank robbery. It calls upon Member States to strengthen border management to effectively

prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups, including those benefiting from transnational organized crime and to promote collaboration to prevent and combat terrorism.

UNSCR 2220 (2015)

[UNSCR 2220](#) reaffirms its decision that States shall eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as its calls for States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding trafficking in arms, and to enhance co-ordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels. It encourages the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, within their existing mandates and in close co-operation with all relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, to focus on the threats posed by accessibility of weapons used by individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida and the supply and trafficking of weapons to them and requests the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to include in its next regular report to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) information on such threats and to provide recommendations for actions to enhance the response to such threats; It also encourages the Counter-Terrorism Committee and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), within their existing mandates and in close co-operation with all relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, to focus on Member States’ capacities and needs to address the threats posed by accessibility of weapons used by terrorists as well as to counter the supply and trafficking of weapons to terrorists and requests the CTED to report within the existing reporting framework to the Counter-Terrorism Committee on gaps in such capacities, and to provide concrete plans to facilitate technical assistance for strengthening Member States’ capacities and to provide recommendations for actions to enhance response to such threats.

UNSCR 2242 (2015) and 2250 (2015)

Through [UNSCR 2242](#), the Council decided to integrate women, peace and security concerns across all country-specific situations on its agenda. On terrorism, the Council urged States and the United Nations to ensure the participation and leadership of women's organizations in devising strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism. It requested the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue within their respective mandates.

[UNSCR 2250](#) focuses on youth⁵ in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security. It emphasizes the nexus with countering terrorism and countering violent extremism leading to terrorism. Recognizing the threat to stability and development posed by the rise of radicalization among young people, this resolution urges Member States to consider ways to give youth a greater voice in decision-making at the local, national, regional and international levels, and to consider setting up mechanisms that would enable young people to participate meaningfully in peace processes and dispute resolution.

UNSCR 2322 (2016)

[UNSCR 2322](#) reaffirms the UN Member States' commitment to counter terrorism by recalling its earlier resolutions in this regard and emphasizes the need for international co-operation. It calls in particular for an enhanced exchange of information between domestic agencies as well as internationally, to prevent terrorist acts as well as "to prevent terrorists from benefitting from transnational organized crime" and "to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, commit terrorist acts (...)." The resolution furthermore identifies various avenues for enhancing international co-operation, including through the ratification and implementation of the international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols (UATIs), the enactment and application of effective

national laws on extradition and mutual legal assistance, the designation of Central Authorities tasked with the handling of requests for mutual legal assistance and/or extradition in terrorism-related cases, the suggestion to allow for an electronic exchange of such requests between Central Authorities, and the more effective use of existing platforms such as INTERPOL's secure global communication system (I-24/7) and the strengthening of this organization's network of National Central Bureaus.

THE UNIVERSAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

The Universal Legal Instruments and Amendments (later referred to also as "[Universal Anti-Terrorism Instruments](#)"- UATI) have been elaborated, within the framework of the UN system, to prevent terrorist acts.

These instruments (in total 19 conventions and protocols) were negotiated from 1963 onwards. Most are penal in nature and have a common format. Typically, the instruments:

1. Define a particular type of terrorist violence as an offence under the convention, such as seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or use of violence;
2. Require State Parties to penalize that activity in their domestic law;
3. Identify certain bases upon which the Parties responsible are required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offence, such as registration, territoriality or nationality;
4. Create an obligation on the State in which a suspect is found, to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence and to refer the offence for prosecution if the Party does not extradite pursuant to other provisions of the convention. This last element is commonly known as the principle of "no safe haven for terrorists". It has been stressed by the Security Council in Resolution 1373 as an essential anti-terrorism obligation of UN Member States.

The TNTD/ATU produces, every six months, an update with the [status of ratification in the OSCE area](#), and co-operates with the [UNODC](#)

⁵ This resolution defined youth as persons aged 18 through 29

[Terrorism Prevention Branch](#) (TPB) in providing specialized assistance to requesting Member States in the legal and related aspects of counter-terrorism, especially for ratifying and implementing the 19 universal legal instruments against terrorism, and also for strengthening the capacity of their criminal justice systems to apply the provisions of these instruments, in full compliance with the principles of the rule of law and human rights. The 19 instruments are the following:

a) Related to aviation security

1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (*Aircraft Convention or Tokyo Convention*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- Applies to acts affecting in-flight safety;
- Authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is about to commit such an act, where necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft; and
- Requires States Parties to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.

This Convention was amended by the **2014 Protocol to the Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft**⁶ (*Montreal Protocol*). Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- It expands the jurisdiction over offences and acts committed on board aircraft from the State of Registration of the aircraft to the State of the Operator and the State of Landing. Where the State of Registration, the State of the Operator, or the State of Landing has become aware that one or more of the other States are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial

proceeding in respect of the same offence or act, that State will consult the other States with a view to co-ordinating their actions.

1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (*Unlawful Seizure Convention or The Hague Convention*) Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- Makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight to "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do so;
- Requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe penalties"; and
- Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution; and
- Requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the Convention.

2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft⁷ (*Beijing Protocol*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- Supplements the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (1970) by expanding its scope to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including through modern technological means; and
- Incorporates the provisions of Beijing Convention relating to a threat or conspiracy to commit an offence.

1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (*Civil Aviation Convention or Montreal Convention*) Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of

⁶ Not in force as of February 2015

⁷ Not in force as of February 2015

America. Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- Makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; to attempt such acts; or to be an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such acts;
- Requires parties to the Convention to make offences punishable by "severe penalties"; and
- Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution.

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (*Airport Protocol*)

Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- Extends the provisions of the Civil Aviation Convention (1971) -see above- to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.

2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation⁸ (*New Civil Aviation Convention or Beijing Convention*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- Replaces the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation;
- Criminalizes the act of using civil aircraft as a weapon to cause death, injury or damage;
- Criminalizes the act of using civil aircraft to discharge biological, chemical and nuclear (BCN) weapons or similar substances to

cause death, injury or damage, or the act of using such substances to attack civil aircraft;

- Criminalizes the act of unlawful transport of BCN weapons or certain related material;
- A cyber-attack on air navigation facilities constitutes an offence;
- A threat to commit an offence may be an offence by itself, if the threat is credible; and
- Conspiracy to commit an offence, or its equivalence, is punishable.

b) Related to maritime security

1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (*Maritime Convention or SUA Convention*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Information on status provided by IMO, available on [IMO web site](#):

- Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established for international aviation; and
- Makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety of ships.

2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Information on status provided by IMO, available on [IMO web site](#):

- Criminalizes the use of a ship as a device to further an act of terrorism;
- Criminalizes the transport on board a ship of various materials knowing that they are intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or serious injury or damage to further an act of terrorism;
- Criminalizes the transporting on board a ship of persons who have committed an act of terrorism; and

⁸ Not in force as of February 2015

- Introduces procedures for governing the boarding of a ship believed to have committed an offence under the Convention.

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (*Fixed Platform Protocol*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Information on status provided by IMO, available on [IMO web site](#):

- Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation.

2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Information on status provided by IMO, available on [IMO web site](#):

- Adapts the changes to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to the context of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.

c) Related to nuclear security

1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material -CPPNM- (*Nuclear Material Convention*) Deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The information on status provided by IAEA is available on [IAEA web site](#):

- Criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer or theft of nuclear material and threats to use nuclear material to cause death, serious injury or substantial property damage.

2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material⁹ - CPPNM- Deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The information on status provided by IAEA is available on [IAEA web site](#):

- Makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport; and
- Provides for expanded co-operation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences or sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (*Nuclear Terrorism Convention*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Information on status provided by UN, available on [UN web site](#):

- Covers a broad range of acts and possible targets, including nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors;
- Covers threats and attempts to commit such crimes or to participate in them, as an accomplice;
- Stipulates that offenders shall be either extradited or prosecuted;
- Encourages States to co-operate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information and assisting each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings; and
- Deals with both crisis situations (assisting States to solve the situation) and post-crisis situations (rendering nuclear material safe) through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

d) Related to protected persons and hostages

1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (*Diplomatic Agents Convention*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Information on status provided by UN, available on [UN web site](#):

- Defines an "internationally protected person" as a Head of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, representative or official of a State or international organization who is entitled to special protection in a foreign State, and his/her family; and

⁹ Not in force as of February 2015

- Requires parties to criminalize and make punishable "by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature" the intentional murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act "constituting participation as an accomplice".

1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (*Hostages Convention*)

Deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Information on status provided by UN, available on [UN web site](#):

- Provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of this Convention".

e) Related to explosives and bombings

1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection ¹⁰

(*Plastic Explosives Convention*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Aviation Organization. Information on status provided by ICAO, available on [ICAO web site](#):

- It is considered part of the instruments related to civil aviation security;
- Designed to control and limit the use of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing);
- Parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective control over "unmarked" plastic explosives; and

- Generally speaking, each party must, *inter alia*, take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic explosives; prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry into force of the Convention; ensure that all stocks of unmarked explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed, consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within three years; take necessary measures to ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police are destroyed, consumed, marked or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen years; and, ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the date of entry into force of the Convention for that State.

1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (*Terrorist Bombing Convention*)

Deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Information on status provided by UN, available on [UN web site](#):

- Prohibits any person(s) from intentionally delivering, placing, discharging, or detonating an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, or an infrastructure facility with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility, or system, resulting in or likely to result in major economic loss;
- Mandates to co-operate in the prevention of such offenses by prohibiting in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups, and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance, or engage in the perpetration of such offenses.
- Further co-operation is required through the exchanging of accurate and verified information; and where appropriate through research and development regarding methods of detection of explosives, consultations on the development of standards for marking

¹⁰ This Convention is included into the "Explosives and Bombings" section of this document. The Convention itself forms part of the "Aviation Security" related Instruments.

explosives in order to identify their origin in post-blast investigations, exchange of information on preventive measures, co-operation, and transfer of technology, equipment, and related materials.

f) Related to terrorism financing

1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (*Terrorist Financing Convention*) Deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Information on status provided by UN, available on [UN web site](#):

- Requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in illicit activities such as drug trafficking or gun running;
- Commits States to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts; and
- Provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other States on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy is no longer adequate justification for refusing to co-operate.

KEY OSCE CT COMMITMENTS

Several high-level OSCE meetings have taken place and produced key documents that shape how the OSCE prevents and combats terrorism.

An [Overview of OSCE Counter-Terrorism Related Commitments](#) is available online.

The most comprehensive counter-terrorism document adopted in the OSCE is the [Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism](#).

The framework defines the following strategic areas when considering future OSCE counter-terrorism activities, in line with relevant OSCE counter-terrorism commitments and existing mandates:

- Promoting the implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism and enhancing international legal co-operation in criminal matters related to terrorism;
- Countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, following a multidimensional approach;
- Preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism;
- Countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes;
- Promoting dialogue and co-operation on counter-terrorism issues, in particular, through public-private partnerships between State authorities and the private sector (business community, industry), as well as civil society and the media;
- Strengthening national efforts to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- Strengthening travel document security;
- Promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures.

PC.DEC/1063, on *Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism*, was adopted on the 7th December 2012, at the time of the Dublin Ministerial Council. It builds on relevant previous decisions of the Ministerial Council and the Permanent Council. It further strengthens the profile of the OSCE in the struggle against terrorism. The Decision highlights the OSCE's anti-terrorism profile listing comparative advantages of the Organization. The Decision provides guidance for the OSCE outlining strategic focus areas for counter-terrorism activities. There with the Decision is a roadmap for any further OSCE action to be taken in the area of countering terrorism.

Importantly, the Consolidated Framework stipulates that the OSCE will further co-ordinate its efforts internally and co-operate externally with relevant regional and international organizations, including through holding as appropriate and preferably annually, focused, results-oriented, OSCE-wide counter-terrorism conferences.

The Secretary General will continue to ensure co-ordinated efforts among thematic structures within the Secretariat and other executive structures in the pursuit of activities related or relevant to counter-terrorism, in order to maximize the use of resources and available expertise.

The OSCE Secretariat will continue to ensure the facilitation and cross-dimensional and cross-institutional co-ordination of all OSCE counter-terrorism activities, without prejudice to the mandates of other OSCE executive structures. To this end, other OSCE executive structures are tasked to proactively inform the Secretariat about their planned and on-going activities related to counter-terrorism. The TNTD/ATU will continue to act as the focal point and as an information resource and implementation partner on OSCE counter-terrorism activities.

OTHER RELEVANT OSCE DOCUMENTS ADOPTED BY THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL¹¹

2001 Bucharest Ministerial Council

The [Bucharest Plan of Action](#) for Combating Terrorism recognized that the respective UN conventions, protocols and Security Council Resolutions constitute the basis for the global legal framework for the fight against terrorism. Following the Ministerial Council, the Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia, conducted in December 2001 endorsed a [Programme of Action](#) that outlined a broad number of areas for concrete action to prevent and combat terrorism.

2002 Porto Ministerial Council

The OSCE strengthened its anti-terrorism regime by adopting two documents. These were the [OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism](#), as well as the decision on *Implementing the OSCE Commitments and Activities on Combating Terrorism* ([MC Decision No 1/02](#)).

2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council

It included decisions on *Travel Document Security* ([MC Decision No. 7/03](#)), the establishment of the *Counter-Terrorism Network* ([MC Decision No. 6/03](#)), as well as an endorsement ([MC Decision No. 8/03](#)) of the Forum for Security Co-operation's decision ([FSC.DEC/7/03](#)) on *Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)* in July 2003.

2004 Sofia Ministerial Council

Participating States adopted the Sofia Ministerial Statement on *Preventing and Combating Terrorism* [MC\(12\).JOUR/2](#). The Statement expressed the intention to step up OSCE activities and measures to prevent and combat terrorism. In Sofia were also adopted the decision on *Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes* ([MC Decision No. 3/04](#)); the decision on *Enhancing Container Security*

([MC Decision No. 9/04](#)); the decision on *Reporting lost/stolen Passports to Interpol's automated search facility/stolen travel document database* ([MC Decision No. 4/04](#)). In addition,

a decision was taken to further implement the OSCE document on stockpiles of conventional ammunition ([MC Decision No. 5/04](#)), and the decisions of the Forum for Security Co-operation were endorsed: OSCE standard elements of end-user certificates and verification procedures for small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports ([MC Decision No. 6/04](#)), OSCE Principles on the Control of brokering in SALW ([MC Decision No. 7/04](#)), and OSCE principles for export controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) ([MC Decision No. 8/04](#)).

2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Council

It adopted a decision on *Enhancing Legal Co-operation in Criminal Matters Related to Counter-terrorism* ([MC Decision No. 4/05](#)), as well as the decision on *Further Measures to Enhance Container Security* ([MC Decision No. 6/05](#)), the decision on *Combating Transnational Organized Crime* ([MC Decision No. 3/05](#)); *Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs* ([MC Decision No. 5/05](#)); *Tolerance and Non-Discrimination: Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding* ([MC Decision No. 10/05](#)); the *Border Security and Management Concept, Framework for Co-operation by the OSCE Participating States* ([MC \(13\) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8](#)).

2006 Brussels Ministerial Council

A decision was adopted on *Further Measures to Prevent the Criminal Use of Lost/Stolen Passports and Other Travel Documents* ([MC Decision No. 6/06](#)), a decision on *Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes* ([MC Decision No. 7/06](#)) as well as the Brussels Ministerial Statement on *Supporting and Promoting the International Legal Framework against Terrorism* ([MC.DOC/5/06](#)); and a [MC Decision No. 10/06](#) on *supporting national implementation of UNSCR 1540*, was also adopted.

¹¹ All other Decisions, relevant for CT, adopted by the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation, are included as an annex at the end of this document.

2007 Madrid Ministerial Council

A decision was adopted on *Public-Private Partnerships in Countering Terrorism* ([MC Decision No. 5/07](#)), as well as a decision on *Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorist Attacks* ([MC Decision No. 6/07](#)). The Ministerial Statement on *Supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* ([MC Document 3/07](#)) re-affirmed the full support of the OSCE for the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

2008 Helsinki Ministerial Council

Participating States adopted the Ministerial Decision on *Further Promoting the OSCE's Action in Countering Terrorism* ([MC Decision No. 10/08](#)), calling upon participating States to continue promoting public-private partnerships in countering terrorism, and to make use of the OSCE in countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism. Another CT relevant decision was adopted on *Further Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OSCE Area* ([MC Decision No. 7/08](#)).

2009 Athens Ministerial Council

A decision was adopted on *Further OSCE Efforts to Address Transnational Threats and Challenges to Security and Stability* ([MC Decision No. 2/09](#)). Moreover, participating States adopted a decision on *Further Measures to Support and Promote the International Legal Framework against Terrorism* ([MC Decision No. 3/09](#)), as well as a decision on *Travel Document Security – ICAO Public Key Directory* ([MC Decision No. 11/09](#)). Other decisions and documents are related to the fight against terrorism, such as the Ministerial Decision on *Combating Hate Crimes* ([MC Decision No. 9/09](#)), the Ministerial Declaration on *Non-Proliferation* ([MC\(17\) Journal No. 2, Agenda Item 8](#)) and the Decision on *Issues Relevant to the Forum for Security Co-Operation* ([MC Decision No. 16/09](#)), that called the FSC to facilitate, where appropriate, the fulfillment by the OSCE participating States of the provisions of UNSCR 1540.

2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council

With Vilnius [MC Decision No. 9/11](#) on *Strengthening Co-ordination and Coherence in the OSCE's efforts to Address Transnational Threats*, the OSCE participating States welcomed the proposal by the Secretary General for the creation of a department to address transnational threats within the Secretariat, with a view to ensuring better co-ordination, strengthened coherence and more efficient use of the OSCE's resources in addressing transnational threats. Another Decision, on the *Proper Role of the OSCE in Facilitation of UNSCR 1540* ([MC Decision No. 8/11](#)), was adopted in Vilnius.

2012 Dublin Ministerial Council

[MC Decision No. 4/12](#) on *OSCE's Efforts to Address Transnational Threats*, adopted in Dublin, welcomed four Decisions approved in the area of transnational threats by the Permanent Council throughout 2012 and tasked the Secretary General to promote the implementation of these decisions: *Development of Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies* ([PC Decision No. 1039](#)); *OSCE Concept for Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors* ([PC Decision No. 1048](#)); *OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities* ([PC Decision No. 1049](#)) and the *OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism* ([PC Decision No. 1063](#)). A [Declaration](#) was also adopted on *Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism*.

2013 Kyiv Ministerial Council

A Ministerial Declaration was adopted on *Strengthening the OSCE's Efforts to Address Transnational Threats* ([MC. DOC/2/13](#)) that, *inter alia*, welcomes the Initial set of OSCE confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies ([PC Decision No. 1106](#)).

2014 Basel Ministerial Council

Two significant anti-terrorism declarations were adopted during the Ministerial Council in Basel. The declaration ([MC.DOC/5/14](#)) on *The OSCE Role in Countering the Phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Context of the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178 (2014)* –hereinafter FTF- reiterates applicable OSCE commitments and international obligations in terms of preventing the movements of foreign terrorist fighters; co-operating to bring FTF to justice on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute; preventing and suppressing the financing of FTF; countering the use of the Internet for the purpose of inciting and recruiting FTF; developing public-private partnerships against FTF; and exchanging information on good practices, policies and measures to counter VERLT¹². OSCE executive structures are called upon to continue providing assistance and promoting efforts in the areas of international legal and operational co-operation; countering VERLT, in particular at the local level; and travel document security. Furthermore they are called upon to facilitate thematic discussions on FTF and to promote the GCTF's¹³ “[The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon](#)”.

The second CT declaration adopted in Basel was ([MC.DOC6/14](#)) on *the OSCE Role in Countering Kidnapping and Hostage-taking Committed by Terrorist Groups in the Context of the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2133*, -hereinafter KFR-. It calls

¹² Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism

¹³ The Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) is an informal, multilateral counterterrorism (CT) platform that focuses on identifying critical CT needs, mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs, and enhance global co-operation. It provides a venue for national CT officials and practitioners to meet with their counterparts from key countries in different regions to share CT experiences, expertise, strategies, capacity needs, and capacity-building programs. It serves as a mechanism for furthering the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and, more broadly, complements and reinforces existing multilateral CT efforts, starting with those of the United Nations.

upon participating States to strengthen efforts to prevent the kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups, and secure the safe release of hostages. It also calls on States to prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions. Moreover, the declaration encourages promoting public-private dialogue, sharing experiences, exchange of information and best initiatives and supports the continuance of capacity-building for practitioners, taking into account, *inter alia*, the set of good practices contained in the GCTF's [Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists](#).

2015 Belgrade Ministerial Council

Participating States adopted two declarations in the field of countering terrorism: Declaration No. 3/15 on *Reinforcing OSCE Counter-Terrorism Efforts in the Wake of Recent Terrorist Attacks* ([MC.DOC/3/15](#)) condemns the terrorist attacks perpetrated in 2015 across the OSCE area and in its neighborhood, in particular by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also known as DA'ESH, Al-Nusrah Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida. The Declaration reiterates the determination of participating States to co-operate fully in the fight against terrorism and their other relevant OSCE commitments.

The Declaration No. 4/15 on *Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism* ([MC.DOC/4/15](#)) provides a blueprint for further OSCE efforts to counter VERLT following a multi-dimensional approach, which is one of the eight strategic focus areas identified for OSCE counter-terrorism activities. The Declaration identifies a number of good policy practices which OSCE participating States undertook to pursue, and the ways in which OSCE executive structures, upon request and within their respective mandate, can assist them. The Declaration also tasks Field Operations to report to the OSCE Permanent Council, through the Secretariat, on their past, current and possible future activities in this field.

2016 Hamburg Ministerial Council

At the Ministerial Council in Hamburg, OSCE participating States adopted a *Declaration on Strengthening OSCE Efforts to Prevent and Counter Terrorism* ([MC.DOC/1/16](#)) and a *Decision on Enhancing the Use of Advance Passenger Information* ([MC Decision No. 6/16](#)).

[MC.DOC/1/16](#) condemns the terrorist attacks perpetrated in 2016 and reiterates the determination of participating States to co-operate fully in the fight against terrorism and their other relevant OSCE commitments. The Declaration takes positive note of the continued implementation of the “OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism (#United CVE) campaign”, and stresses the importance of involving where appropriate, civil society, the media and the private sector to prevent and counter terrorism, *inter alia*, to counter terrorist and violent extremism messaging and to offer alternatives. The Declaration also mentions the commitment to refrain from engagement in favour of terrorist organizations in direct or indirect trade in natural resources, such as oil and oil products, in weapons, ammunition and spare parts, in cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific and religious importance.

With reference to [MC Decision No. 6/16](#), Advance Passenger Information (API) data includes passenger biographical data and basic flight details that are generally collected by airlines from the passenger’s passport or other government-issued travel document. By adopting the Ministerial Council Decision, the OSCE participating States committed themselves to promoting the implementation of key United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions [2178](#) (2014) and [2309](#) (2016), which call upon States to require that airlines operating in their territories provide API data to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the movement on their territories of persons suspected of intending to commit terrorist acts. The text of the decision stipulates that the OSCE participating States will establish national API systems in alignment with existing international standards and seek to automatically cross-check the data against

watch lists. It tasks the OSCE executive structures with supporting participating States in doing this. The Ministerial Council Meeting also adopted a Declaration on OSCE Assistance Projects in the Field of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition ([MC.DOC/3/16](#)). The Declaration recognizes the relationship between the availability of illicit small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition and terrorism and welcomes OSCE practical assistance projects aimed to assist the participating States. It also invites OSCE Partners for Co-operation to consider opportunities to jointly engage with the OSCE participating States on mitigating risks arising from the presence and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons as well as stockpiles of conventional ammunition.

OSCE'S COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITMENTS AT WORK

In the OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, the participating States reiterate that the prevention and/or fight against terrorism must be built upon a comprehensive approach to security, using the three OSCE dimensions¹⁴ (the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension, and the human dimension) and all OSCE structures, institutions and Field Operations at the request of, and in close co-operation and agreement with host governments.

The OSCE's comprehensive approach to security in fact gives the Organization an enhanced value, which helps to effectively counter terrorism and at the same time address factors that may feed violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism. Activities carried out by different OSCE institutions and structures, as well as activities undertaken by Field Operations, are important key elements of the organization's approach in this regard.

The Transnational Threats Department, Action against Terrorism (hereinafter TNTD/ATU) acts as focal point, information resource and implementation partner on OSCE counter-terrorism activities. TNTD/ATU co-ordinates closely with the United Nations, in particular with the CTITF and its entities like CTED and the UNCCT, and co-operates with other relevant international and regional organizations to complement efforts and maximize synergies in addressing counter-terrorism issues; the Secretariat, and in particular the TNTD/ATU, serves as primary interface in this regard.

This Consolidated Reference contributes to maintain and intensify the co-operation between the TNTD/ATU and the OSCE Field Operations and other structures, in order to streamline anti-terrorism components in relevant activities. The following part of the document contains a description of activities being implemented by different OSCE executive structures and can be used by Field Operations and others as an aid in conceptualizing, planning and implementing

activities within the general scope of OSCE anti-terrorism goals.

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS DEPARTMENT (TNTD)

Ministerial Council Decision No. 9/11 on Strengthening Co-ordination and Coherence in the OSCE's Efforts to Address Transnational Threats welcomed the proposal by the Secretary General for the creation of a department to address transnational threats. TNTD became operational at the beginning of 2012. The role of TNTD is to support the Secretary General as focal point for Organization-wide programmatic activities that relate to countering transnational threats, and to ensure co-ordination and coherence of action across all three OSCE dimensions, among all OSCE Executive Structures, while respecting their mandates.

To further strengthen OSCE's efforts in addressing transnational threats, the Ministerial Council adopted a decision on OSCE's Efforts to Address Transnational Threats in Dublin in December 2012 (MC.DEC/4/12). This 'chapeau' decision endorsed four decisions the Permanent Council (PC) had adopted earlier in 2012:

- Development of confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies (PC Decision No. 1039);
- OSCE Concept for Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors (PC Decision No. 1048);
- OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities (PC Decision No. 1049); and
- OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism (PC Decision No. 1063).


PC Decision 1039 provided a clear new tasking with regard to cyber/ICT security. The remaining three PC Decisions consolidated already existing operational principles and priorities expressed through various previous decisions. In that respect, they provide an important framework for the activities of the OSCE Executive Structures regarding TNT activities.

At the 2013 Ministerial Council in Kyiv, the participating States adopted a Declaration on Strengthening the OSCE's Efforts to address

¹⁴ <http://www.osce.org/who>

Transnational Threats (MC.DOC/2/13) which underlines priority areas with regard to TNTs in the OSCE framework. The Ministerial Council also adopted an initial set of cyber/ICT confidence-building measures (CBMs) via PC Decision 1106.

TNTD is led by a Co-ordinator and is comprised of the following units: Co-ordination Cell (CC), Action against Terrorism (ATU), Border Security and Management (BSMU) and Strategic Police Matters (SPMU).



Co-ordination Cell (TNTD/CC)

TNTD/CC supports the Secretary General in ensuring better co-ordination, strengthened coherence and more efficient use of the OSCE's resources when addressing TNT activities among all OSCE executive structures. To this end, it co-ordinates TNT-related activities within TNTD, the Secretariat, OSCE Field Operations and Institutions.

TNTD/CC supports the Secretary General, the Chairmanship-in-Office and the participating States in all cyber/ICT security related matters and acts as focal point for participating States' requests for activities aimed at enhancing cyber/ICT security. In line with PC Decisions 1039, 1106, and 1202 as well as MC.DEC/5/16 TNTD/CC continues to support OSCE participating States in their efforts to implement the cyber/ICT security CBMs as well as with identifying additional CBMs.

TNTD/CC provides online information and management support to Field Operations and participating States via the POLIS system (<http://polis.osce.org>). POLIS is a centralized, web-based electronic repository and communication platform for capturing and sharing TNT-related information, training

materials, best practices and lessons learned resulting from OSCE projects, activities, and local initiatives as well as development work with external partners. TNTD uses the system to co-ordinate, complement and support its training and awareness raising activities in the field of TNT, which includes organizing secure online expert discussion fora and developing e-learning modules on aspects related to countering transnational threats. TNTD/CC also provides technical expertise in the area of cybercrime.

TNTD/CC:

- is the focal point in the OSCE Secretariat for all TNT-related activities in the OSCE region (fight against terrorism, border security and management, police related issues, cyber/ICT security);
- stands ready to provide substantive guidance on all the above topics as required;
- can provide online support through POLIS to your TNT-related projects;
- serves as a channel for information on TNT-related matters to and from other OSCE Institutions, Field Operations, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, participating States as well as Partners for Co-operation;
- can provide technical expertise with regard to projects or activities related to countering cybercrime.

Action against Terrorism Unit (TNTD/ATU)

The [OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit](#) was established in 2002 and since January 2012, it is part of the Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) at the OSCE Secretariat. The OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism ([PC Decision No. 1063](#)) states that the TNTD/ATU will continue to act as the focal point and as an information resource and implementation partner on OSCE counter-terrorism activities.

In 2017, TNTD/ATU will continue implementing the OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism (PC Dec 1063), and all relevant Ministerial Council and Permanent Council decisions and declarations (including the recently adopted [MC Declaration 1/16](#) on Strengthening OSCE OSCE Efforts to Prevent and Counter Terrorism and [MC Decision No. 6/16](#) on Enhancing the Use of Advance Passenger Information; by supporting participating States in implementing their anti-terrorism commitments, and by contributing to the enhancement of their capacities to prevent and combat terrorism. TNTD/ATU will help empower OSCE participating States in implementing comprehensive approaches by co-ordinating and facilitating OSCE counter-terrorism activities with effective resources.

Based on the strategic focus areas for OSCE counter-terrorism activities defined in [PC Decision 1063](#), TNTD/ATU will continue working on:

Promoting the implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism and enhancing international legal co-operation in criminal matters related to terrorism

TNTD/ATU is currently partnering with a wide variety of entities. In co-operation with the UNODC and ODIHR, TNTD/ATU promotes and supports the ratification of the 19 Universal Anti-Terrorism Instruments (UATIs). It provides training and facilitates information sharing on the use of tools for co-operation in criminal matters, relevant for countering terrorism. Special attention is also given to legal and criminal justice aspects in relation to the implementation of the MC Declarations on KFR and FTFs.

Consistent with promoting the international legal framework, TNTD/ATU also co-operates with the UN Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in the support of the implementation of UNSCR 1373 and 1624; as well as with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)^[1] and the [International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law](#) in the organization of seminars in line with recommendations contained in the GCTF [Rabat Memorandum](#) on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism

Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector, as well as the Algiers and the Hague-Marrakech Memorandums mentioned earlier. Accordingly, TNTD/ATU will continue organizing national seminars for criminal justice practitioners in collaboration with the GCTF, with the aim to strengthening rule of law compliant criminal justice responses to terrorism.

TNTD/ATU will readily support participating States' and field operation initiatives by facilitating national and sub-regional workshops, roundtables and training of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement, aimed at ratifying and implementing the international legal framework against terrorism, including its tools for co-operation in criminal matters.

Travel Document Security (TDS)¹⁵

The TDS programme consists of four components which are mutually reinforcing and which complement each other in a security cycle consisting of 1) identity management and security; 2) document security; including the use of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Public Key Directory (PKD)¹⁶; 3) border control inspection, including through the use of Advance Passenger Information (API) and access to INTERPOL databases and 4) forged document trainings for border police. These focus areas combine to actively prevent the movement of terrorists, in particular FTFs.

TNTD/ATU will continue supporting requesting participating States in the implementation of their commitments regarding traveler

¹⁵ In 2017, the TDS Programme will be moved to TNTD/BSMU. TNTD/ATU will continue to provide support to TDS-related activities.

¹⁶ [The ICAO Public Key Directory](#) (PKD) is a repository where PKD participating countries deposit the data other countries need to ensure ePassports are authentic. The objective is to make the exchange of information easier and faster. The ICAO PKD does not contain any personal information about any passport holder. It only contains information to confirm that the ePassport has been issued by a bona fide authority and that it has not been tampered with since being issued.

^[1] See note 11.

identification and document security, closely co-operating with Interpol, ICAO, IATA, UN, and other relevant international organizations.

TNTD/ATU will continue its assistance to participating States and Partners for Co-operation with their political commitment to implement the ICAO PKD. The objective is to provide them with all the necessary information to support their participation in the ICAO PKD.

TNTD/ATU will keep facilitating awareness-raising events and capacity building projects to support the establishment of Advance Passenger Information (API) systems in the Western Balkan region, in co-operation with [IATA](#) (International Air Transport Association), ICAO and UN CCT.

TNTD/ATU will continue to provide assistance to requesting participating States, which are preparing to upgrade their identity management and travel document issuing systems, particularly through the promotion of the soon-to-be-published [Compendium of Good Practices](#).

TNTD/ATU is also organizing train-the-trainers courses on Increasing Operational Awareness to Detect Forged Travel Documents.

The Unit will continue to contribute to ICAO expert groups and bodies, as well as to other identity related events where OSCE expertise in the field is solicited.

The TNTD/ATU TDS programme supports participating States and field operations that are interested in assisting their host country in:

- Enhancing its procedures of handling and issuing travel and identity documents hence preventing terrorists and criminals using fake identities from obtaining genuine travel documents;
- Implementing MC Dec. 6/16 and enhancing traveller identification at borders through the establishment of API systems. TNTD/ATU offer workshops that allow participants to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their national passenger processing environments, to determine the technical assistance needs of their country, and to draft a road map outlining the requirements to move towards an API-enabled environment.
- Establishing real-time access to INTERPOL databases, including the [Stolen/Lost Travel Documents \(SLTD\) database](#).
- Upgrading technological security of travel documents to prevent them from being forged or counterfeited. Promoting and assisting host countries in becoming members of the ICAO PKD which is a vital tool to validate the authenticity of electronic passports and identity cards;
- Offering trainings for border police and customs officials to strengthen operational and analytical capacities to detect forged travel documents. Those courses can also be delivered as train-the-trainer format

Countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) following a multidimensional and multi-stakeholder approach

TNTD/ATU manages an overall awareness-raising and capacity building programme on countering VERLT with the objectives of:

- (1) Promoting a multidimensional understanding of VERLT, to inform the formulation of context-specific and gender-sensitive preventive actions, with a specific focus on engaging community-based organizations, women and youth;
- (2) Supporting the formulation and implementation of human-rights compliant policies and measures to counter VERLT, including but not limited to criminal justice responses to incitement to terrorism and recruitment for terrorism;
- (3) Encouraging multi-stakeholder collaboration, both in terms of whole-of-government approach and co-operation between public authorities and civil society, the media and businesses at national and local levels.

Under the VERLT programme, planned TNTD/ATU activities in 2017 include:

- Further roll-out of the social media communication campaign “[OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism](#)” ([#UnitedCVE](#)) launched by the Secretary General and the Chairmanship in July 2015, including general public awareness-raising activities and peer-to-peer awareness raising activities;
- Development of “Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism” (LIVE) training courses to build the capacity of civil society leaders to speak out, mobilize others, and undertake initiatives against intolerance and violent extremism in their respective local context;
- Development of training material for supporting gender mainstreaming in operational responses to VERLT in the security sector. This follows a technical expert meeting on the topic organized by TNTD in November 2016 in co-operation with ODIHR.

- Upon request and in co-operation with ODIHR and relevant Field Operations, national follow-up activities on the basis of the OSCE Guidebook on [Preventing Terrorism and Countering VERLT: A Community-Policing Approach](#) published in March 2014.

TNTD/ATU encourages OSCE Field Operations to approach their respective host authorities to explore how they may provide support in line with Ministerial Declaration No. 4/15 on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism.

OSCE resources on preventing and countering VERLT are available from the relevant [TNTD/ATU webpage](#), including an [Inventory of Policy Documents and Legislation](#) adopted by OSCE participating States to Prevent and Counter VERLT, updated on an annual basis.

Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes

Terrorists use the internet for recruitment and training, collection and transfer of funds for terrorist purposes, the planning and execution of terrorist acts, and the incitement of terrorist violence. OSCE participating States have committed themselves to exchange information about this threat as well as to enhance international co-operation and public-private partnerships, including the development of practical measures to counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes for inciting violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism or for recruiting foreign terrorist fighters.

The comparative advantage of TNTD/ATU efforts related to this portfolio is that they are embedded within the organization’s broader efforts to promote a comprehensive approach to cyber security. It allows looking at a specific perpetrator group in a cross-dimensional and integrated way recognizing the inter-linkages of cyber threats and perpetrators while stressing

the need for human rights compliant responses. In practice, this flexibility allows the TNTD/ATU to think outside the box.

In 2016, the OSCE developed a public, modern on-line tool that will provide online education and awareness about basic and most relevant aspects of how terrorists use the internet for their purposes and ways to counter it. It will include reading material, audio-visual samples, case studies and relevant realistic examples. The module is aimed at a broad range of beneficiaries, especially those groups of people involved and interested in security issues. In 2017, the E-learning module will be placed on the OSCE website, accessible 24/7 and will be available to all visitors free of charge.

TNTD/ATU can support and assist OSCE participating States, Partners for Co-operation, Field Operations initiatives, by facilitating national, regional and sub-regional expert workshops, seminars and trainings, in order to raise awareness and build capacities on different aspects of countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

In addition, TNTD/ATU can assist OSCE's Field Operations in identifying and facilitating contacts with international experts and organizations in this field.

Promoting dialogue and co-operation on counter-terrorism issues, in particular, through public-private partnerships (PPPs) between State authorities and the private sector (business community, industry), as well as civil society and the media

TNTD/ATU promotes PPPs co-operation, mainstreaming it into its programmes. One example of it is the activities aimed at "*Protecting Non-Nuclear Critical Energy Infrastructure*" (NNCEIP). In this field, TNTD/ATU raises awareness and promotes the implementation of good practices in the area of cyber security, with regard to non-nuclear critical energy infrastructure protection against terrorist attacks. It supports State authorities and private sectors in finding

preventive measures in the area of critical energy infrastructure protection; it supports the exchange of best practices; finally it helps develop trainings in protecting critical energy infrastructure by doing table-top exercises.

For more information, consult TNTD/ATU publication [Good Practices Guide on Non-Nuclear Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection from Terrorist Attacks](#) which aims to raise awareness and promote good practice to counter possible terrorist threats to NNCEIs, particularly to industrial control systems and cyber-related infrastructure.

Contact TNTD/ATU to organize national risk/crisis management workshops for all stakeholders, based on the experience and recommendations of the Guidebook.

Countering Financing of Terrorism

OSCE and UNODC will organize a series of trainings on Countering Financing of Terrorism, as a comprehensive capacity building programme based on the needs and local specifics to support efforts to strengthen national frameworks in the field of countering financing of terrorism. It will involve all competent authorities which impact the effective implementation of the country's CFT framework.

Non-Profit Organizations that are abused for financing of terrorism form weak links in the global struggle against the financing of terrorism. In order to raise awareness about these risks, OSCE will continue organizing regional workshops on Supporting the Prevention of Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations for Financing of Terrorism, in co-ordination with UNCTED and the Global Center in the light of the revised Recommendation no 8 from the FATF standards and its revised methodology.

Counter-Terrorism Network (CTN)

Exchange of information is essential for co-ordinated international action against terrorism. TNTD/ATU connects counter-terrorism contact

points within participating States, regional/international organizations, and OSCE executive structures through the OSCE Counter-Terrorism Network (CTN). TNTD/ATU notably publishes a bi-monthly CTN newsletter to inform contact points about the latest counter-terrorism developments in the OSCE region and relevant OSCE activities. TNTD/ATU also moderates an online CTN forum under the OSCE POLIS online platform (<http://polis.osce.org>).

Field Operations and participating States are encouraged to make use of the CTN and its newsletter to advertise their past or upcoming counter-terrorism activities.

Additionally, TNTD/ATU provides:

- Support and assistance in formulating counter-terrorism related programmatic language in the development of the programme outline and unified budget proposals of the Field Operations;
- Support and assistance in identifying and developing project proposals in the counter-terrorism area and their co-ordination with other OSCE structures, in conjunction with the Programming and Evaluation Support Unit of the Conflict Prevention Centre;
- Facilitation of liaison with potential donors for obtaining extra-budgetary contributions for counter-terrorism related projects;
- Assistance in identification and liaison with appropriate international experts for the implementation of counter-terrorism related projects;
- Support and assistance with the assessment and evaluation of implemented projects and the development of follow-up activities.

Strategic Police Matters Unit ([TNTD/SPMU](#))

The OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities (PC Decision 1049), adopted in 2012, outlines how OSCE police-related activities constitute a key element of the Organization's efforts to address threats to security and stability in the OSCE region posed by criminal activity emanating from organized crime, including terrorism and trafficking in drugs and human beings, and an integral part of its efforts in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. By this Decision, TNT/SPMU is designated as "the main focal point" at the OSCE Secretariat "to address threats posed by criminal activity".

Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations

Respect for human rights – of terrorism suspects, victims, witnesses and police officers alike – is of paramount importance as it ensures that the innocent are not wrongly convicted and that the offenders do not walk free. Respect for human rights is, therefore, an integral element of all police operations and an essential part of any successful investigation. Paying attention to the rights and particular needs of the people who are part of the community that a police officer serves, makes the police more effective. This principle applies as much to terrorism-related crimes as it does to other crimes. It is true that the emotion generated by terrorist acts may cloud the judgment of even the most experienced and stoic police officer, and that the often covert and intense nature of terrorism-related investigations can give rise to acute and specific human rights concerns. However, similar emotion and similar issues often arise in investigations of other serious crimes. It is a fundamental requirement of international human rights law that a fair trial depends on a fair and impartial investigation conducted in full compliance with legal and human rights standards. In 2013, ODIHR and TNTD/SPMU jointly drafted and published a practical manual for law enforcement officers on [Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations: A practical manual for law enforcement officers](#).

Investigative and mutual legal co-operation between law enforcement agencies is a critical

component in ensuring the success of terrorism investigations. TNTD/SPMU offers specific assistance to the participating States and OSCE Field Operations to this end. Along with providing technical training, TNTD/SPMU is very active in facilitating mutual legal assistance training. In particular, TNTD/SPMU, over the past years has devoted considerable energy and resources to assist some of the OSCE participating States to fully implement the operational articles of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols. The training events are directed at the entire spectrum of the criminal justice sector. In order to synchronize further reforms in the different sectors of the criminal justice system, with a view to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the entire criminal justice process, TNTD/SPMU elaborated a “[Guidebook on Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform](#)” published in 2013.

Terrorist groups often operate as part of global transnational criminal networks which may involve using the internet to communicate. In addition, to using the internet for communicating, some groups have financed their activities through proceeds of criminal activities that have been transferred electronically through a network of individuals, companies, funds or financial institutions. To meet this development of increased connections between terrorism and criminal activities, cybercrime- and cyber forensics training has become one of the main priorities of the TNTD/SPMU.

The lucrative illicit drug trade is a concern of police responding to terrorism as well. Intelligence collected over the years suggests that some terrorist groups use the proceeds from drug trafficking as means to finance their terrorist activities. As a response, TNTD/SPMU facilitates high-level meetings of law enforcement experts examining new strategies to reduce drugs trafficking and control precursor chemicals.

There is a proven link between trafficking in persons and terrorism. Laundered profits arising from human trafficking can be used as a source of financing terrorist groups and their activities. Among individuals used by terrorists as suicide bombers there may be people (including children) who have been abducted for or forced

to this most brutal form of exploitation. TNTD/SPMU is aware of this trend and has incorporated it into its awareness raising and training activities for the law enforcement in OSCE participating States.

Terrorist activities are by many means and through various aspects trans-borders ones. Police activities and investigations to fight against terrorism lead therefore from one country to another. As a consequence TNTD/SPMU works in close co-operation with TNTD/BSMU to better deal with this particular aspect of terrorism.

TNTD/SPMU is committed to address the improvement of public confidence and trust in the police. TNTD/SPMU’s community policing initiatives seek to enhance the co-operation between the police and the general public. It is generally acknowledged that improved community relations are a major contributor in helping law enforcement to develop investigative leads. Healthy relations between the public and the police, based on mutual trust and respect, is a key factor in dealing with recent dangers of recruitment of young people into terrorist organizations. In this regard, TNTD elaborated a “[Guidebook on Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism: A Community Policing Approach](#)”, launched in March 2014.

TNTD/SPMU is ready to support participating States, field operations and Partners for Co-operation, and encourages them to submit proposals to their host authorities in the above mentioned areas.

Border Security and Management Unit ([TNTD/BSMU](#))

The ability of a State to properly secure its borders through an effective border security and management regime is a key component in any State’s overall effort to combat terrorism. A well designed and properly functioning border security and management apparatus should be designed to contribute to the identification, disruption and dismantling of terrorist networks. Improving the capacities of agencies involved directly or indirectly in border security and

management improves the overall effectiveness of any State to combat terrorism and other forms of serious transnational organized crimes such as trafficking in human beings, irregular migration, trafficking in drugs, weapons, cultural heritage, and illegal smuggling. Improving border security and management also requires co-operation and co-ordination of activities between countries. Hence, it is desirable to consider a cross-border and regional co-ordination approach to activities.

According to the Border Security and Management Concept ([MC.DOC/2/05](#)) adopted by the Ljubljana Ministerial Council, possible OSCE contributions to participating States could range from facilitation (such as political dialogue and confidence-building measures) and general forms of contribution (e.g. technical assistance in enhancing the effectiveness of border structures through the sharing of best practices) to possible specialized assistance in areas such as:

- Combating terrorism, irregular migration and illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons and their means of delivery, as well as related materials, hazardous wastes, drugs and human beings and other forms of transnational organized crime;
- Facilitating free and secure movement of persons; and
- Addressing economic and environmental concerns.

The TNTD/BSMU is the primary point of contact in the Secretariat for border security and management related issues. It is responsible for co-ordinating the OSCE's response to requests from participating States and Partners for Co-operation regarding these issues.

In 2016, TNTD/BSMU jointly with TNTD/ATU launched a train-the-trainer project aimed at establishing the first ever OSCE mobile training team to deliver on-site training to border security and management officials to better identify and interview potential foreign terrorist fighters, in compliance with international human rights standards at entry and exit border check points of OSCE participating States. In addition, the unit is launching the project on trafficking of cultural property in OSCE region, aimed at awareness raising activities covering all pSs and PfCs. The

aim is to make respective services aware of the connectivity between illegal trafficking in artefacts and terrorist financing and to recommend best practices in fight with this phenomenon. The Unit also maintains the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Point Network that facilitates dialogue between the border services, customs agencies, as well as other competent national structures of the participating States on key issues such as migration, anti-corruption, demarcation and delimitation, etc.

The TNTD/BSMU remains available to assist the Field Operations and other Institutions by supporting their policy development, capacity building and interactive training workshops, expert meetings, and assessments of host country capabilities in all aspects of border security and management with a goal of maintaining open and secure borders across the OSCE region.

In addition, the Organization, through its **Border Management Staff College (BMSC)** in Tajikistan, educates and increases awareness of mid-senior level officials on combatting all forms of organized crime including cross-border interdiction, drugs/precursor identification, trafficking in human beings, customs controls, non-intrusive inspection technologies.

The OSCE BMSC is a platform that can be used by the Field Operations and other Institutions to support the professional development and enhancement of the competencies of border security and management officials, supports international co-operation, information exchange and development among border agencies of the OSCE pS and PfC.

Terrorist activities to a very large extent depend on the ability of terrorists to acquire weapons and ammunition. The [OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation \(FSC\)](#) has adopted political measures aimed at fighting the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition. Along with these commitments, participating States also raise awareness and provide technical assistance in meeting the OSCE's high standards on controlling these weapons. In addition, the FSC supports UN international efforts in tackling non-proliferation of WMD.

The Conflict Prevention Centre/Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section provides support and expertise to the FSC Troika and to delegations in monitoring and promoting the implementation of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed in the Vienna Document 2011. The Section further supports the OSCE participating States in fulfilling their commitments under the OSCE Documents of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Stockpiles on Conventional Ammunition by developing and implementing relevant projects. It is also the institutional memory of the organization in the politico-military field as it relates to the FSC's work programme.

Conventional Arm Transfers

In order to promote responsible arms transfers of conventional weapons, the OSCE adopted the [Principles for Conventional Arms Transfers](#) in 1993. These Principles also promoted the exercise of due restraint in transferring arms and provided guidelines for avoiding transfers, notably those supporting terrorist activities. The participating States annually share information on their transfers of conventional arms.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition

The SALW Document ([FSC.DOC/1/00](#)) was adopted by the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 24 November 2000. The Bucharest Plan of Action and the Bishkek Programme of Action both identified it as central to the OSCE's efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, and many

participating States consider it a priority area. The SALW Document itself is a very broad agreement that commits all participating States to a range of norms, principles and measures. If properly implemented, the document could help prevent the diversion of arms into the illegal market, which is a source of supply for terrorist groups.

In 2012, the OSCE Document on SALW was reissued by the FSC to include all relevant FSC decisions on SALW adopted since 2000.

In 2003, the SALW Document was supplemented by the adoption of the [OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition \(SCA\)](#). The SCA Document imposed on States the responsibility over safe and secure storage of conventional ammunition. In order to assist in implementation, Handbooks of Best Practices on SALW (2003) and Conventional Ammunition (2008) were developed.

In 2010, the participating States adopted the [OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons](#). The facilitation of the full implementation of agreed measures along with the consideration of possible new measures in the areas of export and brokering, stockpile management and security as well as destruction of surplus SALW, constitute the main milestones of the Plan.

In 2014, Ministerial Council took decision Nr. 10/14 tasking the FSC to, *inter alia*, ensure coherence and complementarity with the UN framework on SALW, consider the development of an online tool for submission of SALW-related info exchanges and invited participating States to continue general discussions related to the Arms Trade Treaty.

In 2016, FSC Decision 2/16 was adopted which enables the provision of assistance by the OSCE participating States and the CPC to the OSCE Partners for Co-operation using the procedures outlined in the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA.

Export Control Package on SALW

In 2004 the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) decided on the [Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems \(MANPADS\)](#) (FSC.DEC/3/04). In this Decision there is agreement on principles which

have been drawn from the Wassenaar Arrangement's "Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems". It was also agreed to incorporate these principles into national practices, policies and/or regulations, and to promote the application of these principles in non-OSCE countries. In 2008 the FSC updated these OSCE Principles for Export Controls of MANPADS. The purpose of the update is to ensure their more effective implementation by making the principles more easily understandable for commercial exporters and licensing authorities.

FSC Decision No. 5/04 relates to the content of the End-User Certificate (EUC) provided prior to approval of an export-license for SALW (including SALW manufactured under license) or the transfer of SALW-related technology. The Decision provides for a list of standard elements of the EUC and verification procedures for SALW exports. This allows participating States to work out a common approach regarding application of EUC while taking due account of their respective national legislations. The CPC, with the help of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, has also developed a template for the End User Certificate for voluntary use by States. The template is available under FSC.GAL/153/11.

The Forum has also adopted Decision No. 8/04 on [OSCE Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons](#). The principles set forth in the Decision have paved the way for the adoption by participating States of appropriate national legislation to control brokering activities in SALW. In November 2010, the FSC adopted Decision No. 17/10, which requested the participating States to exchange information on their present regulations concerning brokering activities with regard to SALW by 30 June 2011. A summary report of replies can be found under reference number FSC.GAL/98/12.

Illicit Trafficking of SALW by Air

Furthermore, the FSC introduced the topic of illicit trafficking of SALW by air to its agenda in an effort to contribute to reducing the risk of diversion of SALW into the illicit market. An initiative was launched, which led to the adoption of [FSC Decision No. 11/08](#) on

introducing best practices to prevent destabilizing transfers of SALW through air transport and on an associated questionnaire. The participating States supported the development of a mechanism to exchange information on national legislation and regulatory frameworks, enhanced dialogue and increased synergy between actors. By 2014, 47 participating States provided information on the national practices related to preventing the spread of SALW through air transport.

Practical assistance for combatting illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition

The FSC Support Section has supported participating States in their efforts to combat proliferation of weapons and ammunition and reduce the risk of their diversion through development and implementation of programmes and projects within the scope of the assistance mechanism established under the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA.

The interventions are tailored to the needs of the requesting State and encompass a wide range of prevention measures. Many projects include activities to enhance the knowledge and skills of the personnel responsible for security and safety of weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, assistance is provided to increase the physical security of the existing stockpiles and improve the stockpile management practices. This includes support for greater accountability through record-keeping, assistance for identification of surpluses and subsequent disposal.

The assistance for record-keeping is of paramount importance for conducting the tracing of weapons and ammunition and identifying the point of diversion. By establishing and maintaining up-to-date records of weapons and ammunition participating States are able to track the movement of a weapon from its manufacture to when it was seized or otherwise came into the possession of law enforcement agencies.

Non-Proliferation

The OSCE pays special attention to the fulfillment of the obligations of [UNSCR 1540](#), as reemphasized by UNSCR 1977. In December 2009, the Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation was adopted at the Athens

Ministerial Council Meeting. The Declaration, among others, reaffirmed the adherence of participating States to the international treaties and conventions aiming at preventing and prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reiterated their readiness to further enhance and strengthen existing international legal instruments against the proliferation of WMD. Another Ministerial Council Decision of 2009, tasked the Organization to facilitate the fulfilment by OSCE participating States of the provisions of UNSCR 1540 (2004) and in 2011, in Vilnius, a Ministerial Council Decision No. 8/11 on the Proper Role of the OSCE in Facilitation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted in order to identify and strengthen, as appropriate, the specific forms of the OSCE's contribution to assist participating States with implementation of the Resolution. In addition, the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/11 of 7 December 2011, "Issues relevant to the Forum for Security Co-operation", tasked the FSC, in particular, to explore ways to update the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation of 1994 (MC.DEC/7/11/Corr.1 of 7 December 2011). As a result, in December 2013, with Decision No. 7/13, the FSC decided to adopt the Updated OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation. Finally, on 22 July 2015, the FSC adopted a decision on "OSCE's role in support of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)" (FSC.DEC/4/15). In the decision, the FSC highlights the leading role of the 1540 Committee, and decides to strengthen the OSCE's support in facilitating the implementation of resolution 1540, including through effective assistance to participating States, upon their request, including in preparing national implementation measures.

In 2010, the CPC launched an extra budgetary project to support the regional implementation of UNSCR 1540. Through this project, the OSCE seeks to raise awareness of the commitments laid out in the Resolution and to provide practical assistance, upon request, in drafting national implementation action plans (NAP). In its following years, the CPC led extra-budgetary project has moved towards provision of concrete assistance, such as result-oriented trainings and facilitating assistance to interested participating

States in the development and implementation of NAPs on UNSCR 1540.

In October 2011, the OSCE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to increase co-operation between the Parties in the implementation of Resolution 1540 by establishing a non-exclusive framework for technical co-operation. This MoU has led to a number of successful national roundtables, continued country-specific dialogues, and over a dozen of national action plans and/or strategies. Regional awareness-raising events and tailored training courses, co-organized by both organizations, have been held throughout the past years. In 2013 and 2015, the MoU has been extended for two additional years.

Organizing national roundtables have proved to be a beneficial platform for launching a country-specific dialogue where government authorities together with the assistance of the OSCE and UNODA and relevant international experts, under the guidance of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, can discuss their national priorities and create a solid basis for further co-operation and result-oriented action, possibly through national implementation action plans.

On 14 December 2011, the FSC adopted a Decision on "Points of Contact on UN Security Council Resolution 1540" (FSC.DEC/19/11), thus establishing a directory of national and OSCE Points of Contact with the purpose to facilitate information-sharing, promoting best practices as well as strengthening relevant international information exchange networks (where appropriate), between participating States on issues related to the national implementation of UNSCR 1540. The Decision is also seeking to prevent duplication of efforts, including by third parties. The OSCE CPC maintains an up-to-date PoC directory on UNSCR 1540 and electronically distributes it to the 1540 Committee. In this connection, the First Annual Meeting of the Points of Contact on UNSCR 1540 has been held in Vienna in April 2014 under the auspices of the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship, and the Second Annual Meeting of the OSCE Points of Contact on UNSCR 1540 took place in Belgrade, in May 2015, co-organized by the Serbian OSCE Chairmanship and OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre. In June

2016, the Russian Federation hosted a training course for the OSCE 1540 Points of Contacts in Kaliningrad.

In addition, since 2012, the FSC Chair has appointed an FSC Chairperson's Co-ordinators on Non-proliferation Issues who are tasked with facilitation of discussion in the FSC on the implementation of relevant Ministerial Council decisions, as well as with preparation of proposals and food-for-thought papers, for the review and approval of the FSC Chairmanship and subsequent consideration by the FSC.

In July 2015, the Forum for Security Co-operation adopted Decision No. 4/15, which outlines a concrete role for the OSCE in the implementation of the Resolution

Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

In 1994, participating States adopted the [Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security](#), which, among others, commits them to co-operate fully in combating terrorism and to take steps to fulfil the requirements of international agreements by which they are bound to prosecute and extradite terrorists.

This document obliges participating States to provide for democratic oversight of their armed, internal, para-military and intelligence forces as well as the police. They are also obliged to ensure that their armed forces remain politically neutral and to guarantee that the human rights of security personnel are respected. In addition, the Code of Conduct also contains provisions on the respect of international humanitarian law by the armed forces as well as the principle of individual accountability. It requires that armed forces are only assigned to internal security missions in conformity with constitutional procedures, under the effective control of the constitutionally established authorities and that the armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property.

OSCE participating States annually share information on the implementation of these commitments ([answers to the code of conduct questionnaire](#)). The corresponding questionnaire includes four questions on measures to prevent and combat terrorism whereby participating

States list agreements and arrangements to which they are party, report on adopted national legislation for their implementation, and describe the roles and missions of armed and security forces in preventing and combating terrorism. Furthermore, States are invited to share additional information on national efforts pertaining to preventing and combating the financing of terrorism, border control, travel document security, container and supply chain security, the security of radioactive sources, the use of the internet and other information networks for terrorists purposes, legal co-operation, prevention of VERLT, public-private partnerships, and critical energy infrastructure protection.

Suggested field projects could include:

- Seminars and workshops for government officials, military personnel, parliamentarians, arms manufacturers and non-governmental organizations on any of the aspects outlined above;
- Specialized seminars or workshops on the democratic control of armed and security forces, constitutional legitimacy of anti-terrorism operations and the individual accountability of armed and security forces personnel, as well as the role of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the fight against terrorism.
- Public awareness programmes in support of weapons collection activities or reform of weapons possession legislation;
- Consultative assistance and project development for any of the areas outlined above (e.g. technical advice for management and security of small arms and ammunition stockpiles, including destruction);

Carrying out acts of terrorism and maintaining a terrorist organization both require financing. Commitments to combat the financing of terrorism have been embodied in a number of international instruments including UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1373, 1377 and 1540, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the [Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime](#), and the [FATF \(Financial Action Task Force\) Recommendations](#).

Because the financing of terrorism exploits the same loopholes, opacity and lack of oversight in financial regulations that allow money laundering to occur, and because there is a growing body of evidence that organized crime and terrorist organizations work together, efforts to combat the financing of terrorism are frequently conducted together with those to counter money laundering.

Through numerous decisions and declarations, the OSCE holds a mandate to support the participating States in building capacity to address money laundering and the financing of terrorism and the OCEEA has been tasked with leading these efforts at the Secretariat and regional levels. On the specific topic of preventing the abuse of non-profit organizations for terrorism financing purposes, the OCEEA shares its mandates and works closely with the TNTD/ATU. The OCEEA maintains working relationships with key international bodies including the United Nations (UN), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

The OCEEA also works closely with the Financial Intelligence Units of the OSCE participating States and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies to build capacity to prevent, identify and suppress money laundering

and the financing of terrorism in both domestic and cross-border contexts. The OCEEA follows national, regional, and international developments on anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism issues and often responds to national requests for technical assistance on related matters.

How the OCEEA can help Field Operations and others:

- The OCEEA has in-house expertise on matters concerning money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and the process of identifying, seizing, confiscating and reallocating illegal assets. Consult the OCEEA to ensure the strongest possible OSCE initiatives;
- The OCEEA is an important source of contacts and information about national, regional and international partners and both public and private sector experts. Leverage their resources to identify appropriate trainers, speakers and partners for capacity building and exchanges of experience;
- The OCEEA serves as a channel for information and requests to international and regional organizations. The OCEEA can assist in conveying key messages from national authorities to standard setting and evaluation bodies such as the FATF, EAG, MONEYVAL and the Egmont Group as well as additional technical assistance providers such as the UNODC, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In return, please keep the OCEEA informed of your activities related to the financing of terrorism, particularly when the activity may be regional in scope. Doing so allows the OCEEA to leverage the OSCE's collective contacts and initiatives to their fullest extent.

Human trafficking is a serious transnational threat, a form of organized crime that is integrally linked with other crimes and threats to peace and security, such as migrant smuggling, money laundering, corruption, cyber-crime, document fraud, recruitment for terrorist acts.

Experts have good grounds to believe that cases of trafficking for exploitation by terrorist groups are similar to other, more "usual" human trafficking cases in terms of recruitment out of the most vulnerable layers of the population (including children), kidnapping, false promises, enslavement and psychological abuse. Victims may be used as suicide bombers, or exploited by terrorists for forced labour, sexual services, domestic servitude, child soldiering, drug trafficking, forced conscription and forced criminality. Such cases are rarely categorized as human trafficking cases; its victims are treated as accomplices and, therefore, offenders. Moreover, there is now greater awareness of the fact that funds from trafficking in human beings are reinvested into other criminal activities, and are potential sources of income for terrorism.

Due to the dramatic increase in Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) activity fuelled by instability and conflicts near the OSCE region,

¹⁷ Key documents include: the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the UNTOC; OSCE Vienna Ministerial Decision, 2000; OSCE Bucharest Ministerial Decision, 2001; OSCE Porto Ministerial Declaration on THB, 2002; OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings (2003), Maastricht Ministerial Decision (2003), Sofia Ministerial Decision (2004), Ljubljana Ministerial Decisions, including the Addendum to the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings: Addressing the Special Needs of Child Victims of Trafficking for Protection and Assistance (2005); Brussels Ministerial Decisions (2006), Madrid Ministerial Decision (2007), Helsinki Ministerial Decision (2008); Vilnius Ministerial Declaration on Combating All Forms of Human Trafficking (2011); Kyiv Ministerial Decision, including the Addendum to the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human beings: One Decade Later (2013); Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (where appropriate) and others.

The Office of the Special Representative has been looking more closely on the nexus between the FTF phenomenon and human trafficking. The OSR is aiming to identify initiatives the OSCE could undertake to foster a better understanding of the interconnections between the two phenomena, with the goal to promote human rights-compliant and effective solutions.

How the OSR/CTHB can help Field Operations and others:

- The OSR/CTHB can provide expert knowledge on the nexus between human trafficking and counter-terrorism measures. The Office promotes better identification of the victims or people at-risk of being trafficked, outreach work with vulnerable groups within a population, measures to prevent trafficking and rehabilitation of victims, and enhanced criminal justice responses to this heinous crime;
- The OSR/CTHB stands ready to provide technical assistance to the OSCE Field Operations and others in their efforts to assist host countries in implementing their commitments related to combating trafficking in human beings, be it in the course of the annual Focal Points meetings, daily exchange of information, *Alliance* conferences, the SR's official country visits, or annual meetings of the HoMs;
- The OSR/CTHB closely co-operates with national, regional and international partners and is a source of information for both State and non-State actors. The Office can contribute to trainings, including by identifying partners/trainers that specialise in human trafficking and counter-terrorism work.

EXTERNAL CO-OPERATION (EXTCO)

Terrorism is a transnational threat requiring co-ordinated international action. The 2012 OSCE *Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism* mandates the OSCE to co-operate externally with other relevant international and regional organizations to avoid duplication of efforts and maximize synergies in addressing counter-terrorism issues. Regional co-operation enables all partners to address common challenges more effectively by enhancing co-ordination, resource sharing and the exchange of information, best practices and lessons learned.

ExtCo is often the first point of institutional contact with international, regional and sub-regional organizations and institutions. ExtCo maintains established frameworks for regular co-operation at both the political and working levels with the United Nations, including some of its specialized agencies, the European Union, NATO and the Council of Europe. It also cultivates OSCE ties with regional and sub-regional organizations such as the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Co-operation, the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation and the Council of the Baltic Sea States, among many others¹⁸.

ExtCo is also responsible for liaising with the OSCE's Partners for Co-operation, both Mediterranean and Asian. The goal is to include these OSCE adjacent areas into activities of common concern, to enhance co-operation and information sharing, and to develop joint approaches to shared security challenges, including terrorism. A crucial element of the Partnership is the sharing of OSCE norms, commitments and expertise to promote OSCE values, facilitate the exchange of good practices and, if requested, assist the Partners in the voluntary implementation of OSCE commitments¹⁹.

¹⁸ A list of MoUs and other legal documents linking the OSCE (including ODIHR) and other International Organizations is accessible [here](#).

¹⁹ A compendium of OSCE commitments in relation to the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation and an overview of related activities, including on counter-terrorism, is available [here](#). Reflections and perspectives of the OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation,

ExtCo also administers the Partnership Fund, which supports special projects and increased participation by representatives of Partner States in OSCE activities.

How External Co-operation can help Field Operations and others:

- ExtCo is an important source of contacts and information about external partners. All are welcomed to leverage their resources to enhance their own co-operative initiatives and advance the larger goals of the OSCE;
- ExtCo stands ready to put at your disposal its network of contacts, facilitate communication with Partners and assist in identifying counterparts in Partner countries, and international and regional organizations;
- ExtCo also serves as a channel for information to international, regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as to Partner States. As an advisor to the OSCE Chairmanship, the Troika and the Secretary General (SG) on relations with external partners, and as organizer for both political and expert meetings with international organizations, ExtCo can help to convey key messages or questions via the SG and/or the Chairmanship to high-level representatives of partner organizations, and/or to ensure they are raised in staff-level meetings;
- All are encouraged to consult with ExtCo about opportunities to use the Partnership Fund to engage Partner States in their activities.

including an overview of related activities to the benefit of Afghanistan is available at <http://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/asian/197801>.

Counter-terrorism measures must be consistent with human rights standards to ensure that their implementation does not undermine their very purpose, which is to protect and maintain a democratic society. Moreover, respect and promotion of human rights are, in themselves, effective tools for combating terrorism: by protecting human rights, States address the conditions conducive to terrorism, prevent the spread of terrorism and reduce its threat.

The OSCE participating States have repeatedly reaffirmed the utmost importance of the human dimension in preventing and countering terrorism and have pledged in their commitments to fully respect international law and human rights standards in the fight against terrorism. In the 2012 OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, they identified the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures as one of the strategic focus areas for OSCE counter-terrorism activities. The OSCE participating States have reiterated their human dimension commitments in the context of preventing and countering the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters as well as violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) and their support to the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security in the anti-terrorism context.²⁰

Most recently, at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg, participating States have underscored again the need for all actions in preventing and countering terrorism to be conducted in compliance with applicable obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international

refugee law and international humanitarian law.²¹

ODIHR is the OSCE's principal institution tasked with assisting OSCE participating States in implementing their human dimension commitments and thereby enhancing security in the region. In particular, the ODIHR Human Rights and Anti-Terrorism Programme assists participating States in developing and implementing human rights-compliant anti-terrorism policies and offers a comprehensive range of activities in this regard.

Monitoring

Through its research, monitoring and reporting, ODIHR aims at increasing awareness among OSCE structures, State and non-State actors as well as international and regional organizations in the OSCE region of the status, trends, challenges and good practices in the implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments and international human rights standards while countering terrorism.

In November 2015, ODIHR published a 280-page report on the "[Human Rights Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo](#)" following a comprehensive assessment conducted by ODIHR from 2012 to 2015. The report is based on interviews with United States government officials, military and civilian lawyers, non-governmental organizations and former detainees as well as extensive desk-research.

The report examines a broad range of human rights issues, identifies violations of OSCE commitments and other international human rights standards and offers recommendations to address them. The report also explores challenges related to the closure of the detention facility, accountability and redress for human rights violations that may have occurred at the Guantánamo detention facility and as part of the Central Intelligence Agency's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programme. Based on the findings of the report, ODIHR continues to call on the United States to close the detention

²⁰ Ministerial Council Declaration on the OSCE Role in Countering the Phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Context of the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014) (MC.DOC/5/14): <http://www.osce.org/cio/130546?download=true> and OSCE Ministerial Council Declaration on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism (MC.DOC/4/15): <http://www.osce.org/cio/208216>

²¹ Ministerial Council Declaration on strengthening OSCE efforts to prevent and counter terrorism (MC.DOC/1/16): <http://www.osce.org/cio/288176?download=true>.

facility and to either bring the remaining detainees to trial or free them; to fully investigate all human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and prosecute those responsible.²²

Capacity Building

ODIHR supports OSCE participating States in strengthening law enforcement capacities to protect human rights while preventing and countering terrorism.

ODIHR has designed a training module on complying with human rights and effectively countering terrorism which links the respect for human rights with operational effectiveness in the daily work of the police. It is intended for commanders and police line officers involved in counter-terrorism activities throughout the OSCE region. The training adopts an interactive approach to discuss the risks created by counter-terrorism practices that violate OSCE commitments and other international human rights standards, the use of rapport-building interviewing techniques, police interaction with communities and the adverse impact of human rights violations on public trust in efforts to tackle terrorism. It builds on the ODIHR [Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights](#) (English, Russian) manual and ODIHR's extensive experience in delivering training sessions on human rights and anti-terrorism since 2005.

ODIHR and TNTD/SPMU have developed a new training module based on their joint manual on [Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations: A practical manual for law enforcement officers](#) (English, Russian). It complements ODIHR's training module on complying with human rights and effectively countering terrorism by offering a specialized module on counter-terrorism investigations. Following the operational approach of the

manual, this new training module explores the different phases of such investigations and their potential impact on human rights; and it underlines how respect for human rights contributes to increased effectiveness in investigations. The training covers issues such as information-gathering and intelligence; witnesses and crime scene examination; the arrest, detention and questioning of terrorism suspects and the integrity and accountability of investigations.

ODIHR delivers these training courses in the OSCE participating States²³ and welcomes any opportunity to co-operate with Field Operations in the organization of capacity-building activities for law enforcement officials focusing on the protection of human rights when countering terrorism.

Expert advice and analysis

ODIHR provides advice and analysis on key human rights issues in the context of anti-terrorism activities, as well as on conditions that may foster and sustain terrorism.

ODIHR does so by organizing events such as expert meetings and roundtables, preparing background research papers and other publications and tools to facilitate the exchange of best practices, knowledge and experiences from across the OSCE region.

In addition to the two manuals referred to above, ODIHR and OSCE TNTD have also developed a [Guidebook on Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community Policing Approach](#). It provides guidance primarily to policy makers and senior police professionals on central issues that can impact on the success or failure of police efforts to harness a community-policing approach to preventing terrorism and countering VERLT. It can also serve as a useful resource for interested civil society members, in particular community leaders, and can be used as a common reference for OSCE activities in this field. The Guidebook is available in English, Russian, Arabic, Albanian, Bosnian and Serbian.

²² See ODIHR press release on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the opening of Guantanamo on 11 January 2017 at: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/293381>; joint open letter of 2016 issued by ODIHR with four UN independent human rights experts: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/215276>. The ODIHR press release on the publication of the report is available at: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/198796>.

²³ For training courses delivered in 2016 see ODIHR press releases at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/283176> and <http://www.osce.org/odihr/275236>.

With a view to the publication of future policy guidance documents on current human rights and counter-terrorism issues, ODIHR is at present working on two specific areas, namely on human rights compliant implementation of legislation and policies to counter the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters; and on human rights issues arising in addressing VERLT in prisons.

This work builds on previous activities, including an expert workshop on [“The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters: a human rights perspective”](#), ODIHR organized in March 2015, and a background paper on the subject produced for the 2015 Annual OSCE Counter-Terrorism Conference²⁴. ODIHR has also produced a number of other research papers²⁵ on key issues, such as human rights in combating incitement to terrorism and related offences; extradition and human rights in the context of counter-terrorism; protecting human rights while combating the use of the internet for terrorism purposes; solidarity with victims of terrorism; due process and terrorist financing blacklists.

In the past, ODIHR and the OSCE TNTD/ATU produced two reports on [“Women and Terrorist Radicalization”](#) and on [“Youth Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism”](#), presenting the key findings and recommendations put forward during a series of joint expert meetings on these issues. These reports are available in English, Russian, Arabic, Albanian, Bosnian and Serbian.

ODIHR cooperates closely with the TNTD/ATU, including in connection with the organization of conferences such as the OSCE expert meeting on gender mainstreaming in operational responses to VERLT, held in Vienna on 22-23 November 2016.²⁶

Legislative assistance

ODIHR assists OSCE participating States, upon request, in reviewing draft and existing anti-terrorism legislation for their compliance with international human rights standards and OSCE human dimension commitments. The ODIHR online legislative database (legislationline.org) is intended as a resource for lawmakers and other relevant stakeholders in the OSCE region.

ODIHR stands ready to co-operate with Field Operations in reviewing draft legislation or national strategies to prevent VERLT and counter terrorism from a human dimension perspective.

For further information on ODIHR’s work on human rights and counter-terrorism see: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/countering-terrorism>.

²⁴ See “Background Paper: Countering the Incitement and Recruitment of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The Human Dimension”, 25 June 2015, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/166646>.

²⁵ These research papers are available on the webpage of the ODIHR Human Rights and Anti-Terrorism Programme: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/108956>.

²⁶ See joint OSCE TNTD/ATU and ODIHR press release, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/283721>.

These are some ways that describe how ODIHR can support Field Operations or others:

ODIHR can deliver, in co-operation with OSCE participating States and Field Operations, targeted training session on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism, adapted to the context of the host country;

ODIHR developed a set of expert resources on human rights concerns in the fight against terrorism as well as established a network of experts on these issues, which can be made available to OSCE Field Operations or others;

ODIHR can support participating States, upon their request, and Field Operations in reviewing the compliance of draft or existing anti-terrorism legislation with OSCE human dimension commitments and international human rights standards;

ODIHR stands ready to co-operate with OSCE executive structures and Field Operations to implement activities tailored to the needs of the host countries in order to assist them in strengthening the compliance of their anti-terrorism legislation and practices with OSCE human dimension commitments and international human rights standards; ODIHR would particularly welcome to be kept informed of major activities undertaken in this context.

REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA ([RFoM](#))

The 2012 OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism calls on the Representative on Freedom of the Media to work with participating States to uphold freedom of expression and freedom of the media when countering terrorism.

While terrorists, like other criminals, can use the Internet for malicious purposes, the Internet is a portal for free expression and free media, both

of which are rights and cornerstones for democratic societies. Indeed, free media and free expression are safeguards against terrorism and extremism.

Governments have obligations under international laws and conventions, including OSCE commitments, to protect free expression on the Internet.

The RFoM has stated that, although the Internet can be a tool for evil, it also provides an enormous wealth of useful information and virtually limitless opportunities for worldwide communication. The positive aspects of keeping the Internet free from regulation outweigh the risks posed. Thus, any attempt to regulate the flow of information should be carefully considered.

Measures undertaken by authorities should be directed only against illegal content. If a website has to be blocked, any such action has to be transparent, based on law and international obligations, decided by independent courts of competent jurisdiction and allow for the right of appeal. Private enterprises should not be required to shoulder the burden of deciding what content to block or filter.

Regarding the universal fight against terrorism in traditional media, the RFoM continues to participate on several fronts throughout the entire OSCE region, including participating in seminars, commissioning legal reviews and offering recommendations on how to bring laws on terrorism in line with OSCE commitments on free expression and free media.

Throughout her tenure, the RFoM also has raised public attention on the use of anti-terrorism legislation to target journalists, especially on issues related to journalists convicted or imprisoned under anti-terror laws, calling for reforms in the relevant laws.

RFoM is often called to support the work of OSCE structures, including Field Operations, on issues related to terrorism in order to safeguard freedom of the media and freedom of expression. RFoM does so according to her mandate and the related commitments adopted by participating States. RFoM offers such assistance to Field Operations, among others, in the form of legal analyses and recommendations when legislation is debated or adopted or in connection with relevant judicial practice, especially when media are involved.

ANNEX 1 (DECISIONS AND DOCUMENTS)

ADOPTED BY THE OSCE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, PERMANENT COUNCIL AND FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION WITH A FOCUS ON THE OSCE'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AGAINST TERRORISM

- *OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation*, 3 December 1994;
- *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security* (DOC.FSC/1/95), 3 December 1994;
- OSCE Istanbul Summit, *Charter for European Security*, 18–19 November 1999;
- *OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 24 November 2000;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 1, *Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism* (MC(9).DEC/1, Annex), 4 December 2001;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 1, *Implementing the OSCE commitments and activities on combating terrorism* (MC(10).DEC/1), 7 December 2002;
- *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century* (MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 3), 2 December 2003;
- *OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism* (MC(10).JOUR/2, Annex 1), 7 December 2002;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 487, *Financial Action Task Force (FATF) self-assessments on terrorist financing* (PC.DEC/487), 11 July 2002;
- *OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition*, 19 November 2003;
- *OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension* (MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 1), 2 December 2003;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/03, *Terms of reference for the OSCE Counter-terrorism Network and its Annex* (MC.DEC/6/03), 2 December 2003;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/03, *Travel document security* (MC.DEC/7/03), 2 December 2003;
- *Ministerial Statement on Preventing and Combating Terrorism* (MC(12).JOUR/2, Annex 1), 7 December 2004;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 617, *Further measures to suppress terrorist financing* (PC.DEC/617), 1 July 2004;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 618, *Solidarity with victims of terrorism* (PC.DEC.618), 1 July 2004;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 5/04, *Standard elements of end-user certificates and verification procedures for SALW exports* (FSC.DEC/5/04), 17 November 2004;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 8/04, *OSCE Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons* (FSC.DEC/8/04), 24 November 2004;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/04, *Combating the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes* (MC.DEC/3/04), 7 December 2004;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/04, *Reporting lost/stolen passports to Interpol's automated search facility/stolen travel document database (ASF-STD)* (MC.DEC/4/04), 7 December 2004;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 9/04, *Enhancing container security* (MC.DEC/9/04), 7 December 2004;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 14/04, *2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality* (MC.DEC/14/04), 7 December 2004;

- Permanent Council Decision No. 557/Rev.1, *OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings* (PC.DEC/557/Rev.1), 7 July 2005, initially adopted as PC.DEC/557 of 24 July 2003;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 670, *Co-operation between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe* (PC.DEC/670), 28 April 2005;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 683, *Countering the threat of radioactive sources* (PC.DEC/683), 7 July 2005;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 7/05, *Supporting the effective implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)* (FSC.DEC/7/05/Corr.1), 30 November 2005;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/05, *Supporting the effective implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)* (MC.DEC/7/05), 6 December 2005;
- *Ministerial Statement on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* (MC.DOC/1/05), 20 June 2005;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/05, *Enhancing legal co-operation in criminal matters to counter-terrorism* (MC.DEC/4/05), 6 December 2005;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/05, *Further measures to enhance container security* (MC.DEC/6/05), 6 December 2005;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 10/06, *Supporting national implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)* (FSC.DEC/10/06), 30 November 2006;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 5/06, *Organized crime* (MC.DEC/5/06), 5 December 2006;
- *Ministerial Statement on Supporting and Promoting the International Legal Framework against Terrorism* (MC.DOC/5/06), 5 December 2006;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/06, *Further measures to prevent the criminal use of lost/stolen passports and other travel documents* (MC.DEC/6/06), 5 December 2006;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/06, *Countering the use of Internet for terrorist purposes* (MC.DEC/7/06), 5 December 2006;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/06, *Supporting national implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)* (MC.DEC/10/06), 5 December 2006;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 14/07, *Support by the OSCE FSC for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism* (FSC.DEC/14/07), 21 November 2007;
- *Ministerial Statement on Supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (MC.DOC/3/07), 30 November 2007;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 5/07, *Public-private partnerships in countering terrorism* (MC.DEC/5/07), 30 November 2007;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/07, *Protecting critical energy infrastructure from terrorist attack* (MC.DEC/6/07), 30 November 2007;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 5/08, *Updating the OSCE Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems* (FSC.DEC/5/08), 26 May 2008;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 11/08, *Introducing best practices to prevent destabilizing transfers of small arms and light weapons through air transport and on an associated questionnaire* (FSC.DEC/11/08), 5 November 2008;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/08, *Further strengthening the rule of law in the OSCE area* (MC.DEC/7/08), 5 December 2008;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/08, *Further promoting the OSCE's action in countering terrorism* (MC.DEC/10/08), 5 December 2008;
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 7/09, *Best Practice Guide on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Export Controls and Transshipment* (FSC.DEC/7/09), 30 September 2009;

- *Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation* (MC.DOC/5/09), 2 December 2009;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/09, *Further measures to support and promote the international legal framework against terrorism* (MC.DEC/3/09), 2 December 2009;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/09, *Strengthening dialogue and co-operation on energy security in the OSCE area* (MC.DEC/6/09), 2 December 2009;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 11/09, *Travel document security/ICAO Public Key Directory* (MC.DEC/11/09), 2 December 2009;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 16/09, *Issues relevant to the Forum for Security Co-operation* (MC.DEC/16/09), 2 December 2009;
- *OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (FSC.DEC/2/10), 26 May 2010
- Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 3/11, *Destruction of conventional ammunition* (FSC.DEC/3/11), 23 March 2011;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 1063, *Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism* (PC.DEC/1063), 7 December 2012;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 1039, *Development of Confidence-building Measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies*, (PC.DEC/1039), 7 December 2012;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/12, *OSCE's Efforts to Address Transnational Threats* (MC.DEC/4/12), 7 December 2012;
- Permanent Council Decision No. 1049, *OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities* (PC.DEC/1049), 26 July 2012;
- Declaration on *Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism* (MC.DOC/2/12), 7 December 2012;
- Ministerial Declaration on *Strengthening the OSCE's Efforts to Address Transnational Threats* (MC. DOC/2/13), 6 December 2013;
- Ministerial Declaration on the *OSCE Role in Countering the Phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Context of the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014)* (MC.DOC/5/14), 5 December 2014;
- Ministerial Declaration on the *OSCE Role in Countering Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking Committed by Terrorist Groups in the Context of the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2133 (2014)* (MC.DOC/6/14), 5 December 2014;
- Ministerial Declaration on *Reinforcing OSCE Counter-Terrorism Efforts in the Wake of Recent Terrorist Attacks* (MC.DOC/3/15), 4 December 2015;
- Ministerial Declaration on *Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism* (MC.DOC/4/15), 4 December 2015;
- Ministerial Declaration on *Strengthening OSCE Efforts to Prevent and Counter Terrorism* (MC.DOC/1/16), 9 December 2016;
- Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/16 on *Enhancing the Use of Advance Passenger Information* (MC.DEC/6/16), 9 December 2016;
- Ministerial Declaration on *OSCE Assistance Projects in the field of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition* (MC.DOC/3/16), 9 December 2016.

ANNEX 2 (Contact Points)

The TNTD/ATU and other OSCE staff remain at the disposal of all personnel to discuss potential projects. Field personnel or others are encouraged to contact the appropriate individuals below at the earliest possible project planning stage for informal consultations about project strategies and options.

Tel.: +43 1 514 36 + ext	
<p><u>Department of Transnational Threats</u> <u>Action against Terrorism Unit</u> Thomas Wuchte (Head) - Thomas.Wuchte@osce.org / Ext 6710</p> <p>Elizabeth Abela Hampel (Deputy Head) Elizabeth.Abelahampel@osce.org / Ext 6133</p> <p>Jarkko Jokinen (Adviser on Anti-Terrorism Issues) Jarkko.Jokinen@osce.org / Ext 6161</p> <p>Manuel Eising (Senior Legal CT Officer) Manuel.Eising@osce.org / Ext 6772</p> <p>Mehdi Knani (Programme Officer, CTN co-ordinator) Mehdi.Knani@osce.org / Ext 6636</p> <p>Camilla Bognoe (Counter-Terrorism Officer) Camilla.Bognoe@osce.org / Ext 6142</p> <p>Irina Donciu (Associate Programme Officer) Irina.Donciu@osce.org / Ext 6211</p> <p>Simon Deignan (Associate Programme Officer) Simon.Deignan@osce.org / Ext 6186</p> <p>Xenia Beck (Associate Programme Officer) Xenia.Beck@osce.org / Ext 6881</p> <p>Koen De Smedt (Assistant Programme Officer) Koen.DeSmedt@osce.org / Ext 6726</p> <p>Agnieszka Hejduk (Assistant Programme Officer) Agnieszka.Hejduk@osce.org / Ext 6788</p> <p>Selin Freidl (Project Assistant) Selin.Freidl@osce.org / Ext 6788</p> <p>Vera Djemelinskaia, #UnitedCVE Communications and Social Media, Vera.Djemelinskaia@osce.org / Ext 6633</p>	<p><u>Co-ordination Cell</u> Alexandra Prevedourakis (Senior Administrative Assistant) Alexandra.Prevedourakis@osce.org / Ext 6942</p> <p><u>Strategic Police Matters Unit</u> Arnar Jensson (Police Affairs Officer, Adviser on Analysis and Reporting) Arnar.Jensson@osce.org / Ext 6691</p> <p><u>Border Security and Management Unit</u> Dennis Cosgrove (Senior Border Issues Adviser) Dennis.Cosgrove@osce.org / Ext 6662</p> <p><u>FSC/Support Section</u> Robin Mossinkoff (Senior FSC Support Officer) Robin.Mossinkoff@osce.org / Ext 6198</p> <p><u>External Co-operation</u> Loïc Simonet (Senior External Co-operation Officer) Loic.Simonet@osce.org / Ext 6770</p> <p><u>OCEEA</u> Ermelinda Meksi (Deputy Co-ordinator) Ermelinda.Meksi@osce.org / Ext 6730</p> <p><u>OSR/CTHB</u> Ruth Freedom Pojman (Senior Adviser) Ruth.Pojman@osce.org / Ext 6931</p> <p><u>Office of the RFOM</u> Sejal Parmar (Senior Adviser) Sejal.Parmar@osce.org, Ext 6602</p> <p><u>ODIHR</u> Johannes Heiler (Adviser on Anti-Terrorism Issues, Human Rights Department) Johannes.Heiler@odihr.pl / Tel +48 22 5200 742</p> <p>Enrico Boninsegna (Human Rights Officer on Anti-Terrorism Issues, Human Rights Department) Enrico.Boninsegna@odihr.pl / +48 22 5200 765</p>

